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WHO CAN SPEAK FOR THE CHILDREN NOW?
INTRODUCTION
In Idaho v. Wright,' a divided United States Supreme Court2 held that
admission of a child abuse victim's hearsay testimony violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to be confronted with adverse witnesses? The Court held that the
hearsay testimony of the unavailable child sexual abuse victim to a pediatrician, who
had extensive experience in child abuse cases, lacked the 'particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness' which are required for admission under the Confrontation
Clause.'
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution safeguards a defen-
dant's right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" in a criminal trial. The
Supreme Court has not read the right to confrontation to be an absolute right.5 In
apparent contradiction to the Confrontation Clause, the Court has recognized that
certain testimony is so valuable that justice is better served if such testimony is
admitted into evidence. 6 Although the Court has permitted the testimony of
unavailable adverse witnesses to be admitted into evidence for nearly a century,7
hearsay testimony, by its very nature, impinges upon constitutional rights of
confrontation. Thus, the inherent friction between hearsay testimony and the
defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses has been one of the most difficult
questions that the Court has faced.'
This note discusses how the Court reached the decision in Idaho v. Wright to
exclude the hearsay testimony of a child abuse victim. The note examines the
Court's reasoning and the effects which the exclusion of hearsay testimony of child
abuse victims may have on future prosecutions. The note concludes that the Court's
decision is likely to add chaos into the already difficult and complex arena of child
abuse prosecution.
I 110 S.Ct. 3139 (1990).
2 Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Scalia, J.J.,
joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Blackmun, J.J.,
joined.
3 Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3139.
4 Id. at 3149-50.
3 See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394
(1986)..
6 See, e.g., Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
7 See, Id.8 See, e.g., J. MYms, CsmD WrNNss LAW AN PRAcncE 297-300 (1987).
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The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him."9 The right to confrontation illustrates the Framers' belief
that confrontation is an essential and fundamental right of the defendant in obtaining
a fair criminal trial.'" The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the states to permit an accused in a state criminal trial to exercise the Sixth
Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses."
The mission of the Confrontation Clause was to promote the accuracy of the
truth-determining process.1 2 The courts believed that face-to-face confrontation
ensured that the declarant spoke the truth while being subjected to the "ordeal of a
cross-examination."' 3 Because an accuser who must face the accused is less likely
to lie, the courts believed that face-to-face confrontation allowed the trier of fact to
detect false statements. 4 Thus, the law preferred face-to-face confrontation. 5
The law has been slow to change the preference for face-to-face confronta-
tion. 6 As Justice Scalianoted, "there is something deep inhuman nature that regards
face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in
a criminal prosecution. "17 Due to this deep rooted philosophy, the courts have been
reluctant to allow a criminal defendant's rights to slip away.
The defendant's ability to confront adverse witnesses in a criminal trial serves
three purposes:' (1) to insure that the witness' statements are given under oath,
which will thus serve to impress upon the witness the gravity of the criminal
prosecution and guard against false statements through the threat of perjury; (2) to
permitthe jury to observe the witness' demeanor, which will aid the jury in assessing
9 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (1791).
" Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986), overruled on on other grounds by Boudaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171 (1987). The Court described the right to confrontation as "primarily a functional right that
promotes reliability in criminal trials." Id. The Court noted the underlying reasoning of selective
incorporation which the Court articulated in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Specifically, "a
provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory upon




2 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
"Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244.
14 Id. at 242-243.
"Id. at 242.
" See, e.g., Lee, 476 U.S. at 540; Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,63 (1980); Coy v.
Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2801 (1988). The Court in Coy referred to the preference for face-to-face
confrontation in stating: "[w]hat was true of old is no less true in modem times." Id.
17 Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2801 (quoting Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404).
"California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
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the witness' credibility; and (3) to force the witness to undergo cross-examination.
The common focus of the three underlying purposes of the Confrontation Clause
rests upon the individual witness. 19
Of the underlying purposes of the hearsay exceptions, cross-examination is
the most important.20 Moreover, cross-examination is perhaps the best method 2' to
discover the truth. Cross-examination exposes the falsity of a statement through
rigorous questioning.22 A part of rigorous questioning involves leading questions
which are designed to draw the witness away from the truth.23 Leading questions
serve as the principal tool and hallmark of cross-examination. 24 Rigorous question-
ing allows the trier of fact to measure a statement's reliability.
25
Reliability appears to be the key in the controversy over whether to admit
hearsay testimony. The assurance of reliability protects defendants in criminal
cases.26 A statement is reliable if the surrounding facts and circumstances suggest
that it is unusually likely to be trustworthy.27
The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions
The evidentiary rules reflect legal and policy determinations of the scope of
admissible evidence.2" The only evidence which may be admitted is that evidence
which satisfies the technical requirements of the evidentiary Rules. 29
The Federal Rules of Evidence have defined hearsay as those out-of-court
statements which are offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.30
Hearsay is inadmissible unless the rules of evidence, the Supreme Court or an Act
of Congress permit its admittance.31 Public policy sometimes requires courts to
admit certain evidence.32 The Court and the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence
have recognized certain types of hearsay as evidence that should not be lost:
'9 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986).
20Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43. "The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which
he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief." Id.
21 See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64.
2 See, e.g., Id., (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-243).
2 See, e.g., Id. at 71.
4 Id. at 70.
2 See, e.g., Id. at 63-64 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-243).26 Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404.
27 See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89.
2 Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
29Id.
11 Fm. R. Evm. 801(c).
3 FED. R. Evrn. 802.
32 FmD. R. Evm. 803 advisory committee's note.
IDAHO V. WRIGHTFall, 1990]
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"Common sense tells that much evidence which is not given under the three
conditions (in the Anglo-American tradition) [(1) under oath; (2) in the personal
presence of the trier of fact; and (3) subject to cross-examination] may be inherently
superior to much that is." '33 To this end, twenty-four exceptions to the rule against
hearsay exist where the availability of declarant is immaterial; 34 five exceptions to
the rule exist where the declarant is unavailable; 3" three exceptions to the rule exist
where the statements is the witness' prior statement; 36 and five exceptions exist
where the admission is that of a party opponent. 7
The Relationship Between the Confrontation
Clause and Hearsay Exceptions
The Confrontation Clause collides with the Rules of Evidence. 8 The Court
has recognized that while the Confrontation Clause is intended to exclude some
hearsay, 39 the Confrontation Clause does not preclude the admittance of all hear-
say.4" The Confrontation Clause contemplates only evidence marked with such
inherent trustworthiness that there is no material departure from the reason for the
general rule.4 ' The existence of adequate assurances of credibility is the fundamental
touchstone for the admittance of hearsay.42
The Court has consistently refused to "map out" a theory of the Confrontation
Clause that would determine the validity of the residual hearsay exception. 3
Instead, the Court has set forth a "general approach" to determine when the
Confrontation Clause requirements have been met and when they will permit
hearsay evidence to be admitted." First, the party seeking to admit the hearsay
evidence must demonstrate the necessity for the hearsay statement.45 Unavailability
of the declarant establishes necessity. 46 Second, the statement of the unavailable
declarant must bear adequate 'indicia of reliability.'47 Experience has shown the
court that certain hearsay exceptions, such as the excited utterance 4 and dying
declaration,49 are so inherently trustworthy that admission of virtually any evidence
" FED. R. EvID., Article VIII, advisory committee's introductory note.
3FED. R. EYED. 803(l)-(24).
"FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1)-(5).36 FED. R. EviD. 801 (d)(1)(A-C).
37 FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(A-E).
38 See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 73.
39 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
4' Dutton, 400 U.S. at 80.
' Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
42 FED. R. Evm. 803 advisory committee notes.
43 Green, 399 U.S. at 162.
44 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
'5 Id.
4 The court may declare a child witness unavailable for purposes of the necessity requirement. See, e.g.,
Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3146.
47 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
46 FED. R. EviD. 803(2).
49 FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(2).
AKRON LAW REviEw [Vol. 24:2
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within the particular exception comports with the "substance of the constitutional
protection."' 0
The Court has recognized that while the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay
exceptions are "generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite another thing
to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing
more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they
existed historically at common law."'" Constitutional considerations must occa-
sionally yield to public policy and the necessities of a case to protect the interest in
admitting reliable hearsay testimony.5 2
Child Abuse Considerations
Since most child abuse occurs "behind closed doors," it is one of the most
difficult crimes to detect and prosecute. 3 Child victims of sexual abuse feel
vulnerable and guilty, particularly when the abuser is the parent. 5" Even an outside
observer can understand why the child sexual abuse victim would hesitate and refuse
to come forward with allegations of sexual abuse. 5 Even when the child sexual
abuse victim does come forward, particularly difficult problems are encountered in
the prosecution. Presenting especially difficult dilemmas are cases in which the
crime leaves no physical traces, the victim is very young, the victim is directly or
indirectly the key wimess against the alleged abuser, and the case involves incest. -
The increase in child abuse prosecutions thus strains the traditional notions of
procedural justice.57 To address this problem, at least twenty states have enacted
hearsay exception statutes that relate to child abuse prosecutions.58
STATEMENT OF TIIE CASE
Respondent Laura Lee Wright and Wright's male companion Robert Giles
were jointly charged with sexually victimizing Wright's two children in violation of
Idaho Code sec. 18-1508 (1987). 59 At the time of the alleged abuse, Wright's
50 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244).
" Green, 399 U.S. at 155. The Court stated further. [w]e have more than once found a violation of
confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized
hearsay exception. The converse is equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in violation of along-
established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been
denied." Id. at 155-156.
52 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
-- Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
4 Id.
13 See Id.
-1 Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222,1224 (1989), cert. denied, Nelson v. Farrey, 107 L. Ed. 2d 831 (1990).
37 Id.
" M. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The
State of the Relationship, 72 MiNN. L. Rrv. 523, 534 (1988) [hereinafter Confrontation Clause].
" Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3143.
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children were 2 1/2 and 5 1/2 years old.6 °
The natural father of the older daughter agreed to alternate custody with
Wright every six months. 6' In November 1986, the older daughter told Cynthia
Goodman, the girlfriend of her natural father, that Giles had had sexual intercourse
with her while Wright held her down and covered her mouth. 62 The older daughter
also told Goodman that she had seen Wright and Giles similarly abuse Wright's
younger daughter.63
The next day, Goodman reported the allegations to the police and took the
older daughter to the hospital.' 4 Dr. John Jambura, a pediatrician with extensive
experience in child abuse cases, was one of the examining physicians. 65 A medical
examination revealed evidence of sexual abuse. 66 The police and welfare officials
assumed custody of the younger daughter for protection and investigation. 67 The
next day, Dr. Jambura examined the youngerdaughter. 68 From this examination, Dr.
Jambura found evidence which strongly suggested that the younger daughter had
been the victim of sexual abuse with vaginal contact two to three days prior to the
examination.69
The trial court conducted a voir dire examination of the younger daughter at
the joint trial of respondent and Giles. ° The trial court found that the younger
daughter was incapable of communicating to a jury.71 The prosecution and the
parties agreed with the trial court's determination. 72
Under Idaho's residual hearsay exception, the trial court admitted Dr. Jam-














73 The relevant portion of Dr. Jambura's testimony is as follows:
"Q. [By the prosecutor] Now, calling your attention then to your examination of Kathy Wright on
November 10th. What-would you describe any interview dialogue that you had with Kathy at that time?
Excuse me, before you get into that, would you lay a setting of where this took place and who else might
have been present?
"A. This took place in my office, in my examining room, and, as I recall, I believe previous testimony
I said that I recall a female attendant being present, I don't recall her identity.
"I started out with basically, 'i, how are you,' you know, 'What did you have for breakfast this
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:2
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examining room.74 Dr. Jambura acknowledged that a drawing that had been used
during the interview had been discarded and that his summary notes of the
conversation were not detailed and did not reflect any changes in the child's affect
or attitude.75
morning?' Essentially a few minutes of just sort of chitchat.
"Q. Was there response from Kathy to that first- those first questions?
"A. There was. She started to carry on a very relaxed animated conversation. I then proceeded to just
gently start asking questions about, 'Well, how are things at home,' you know, those sorts. Gently moving
into the domestic situation and then moved into four questions in particular, as I reflected in my records, 'Do
you play with daddy? Does daddy play with you? Does daddy touch you with his pee-pee? Do you touch
his pee-pee?' And again we then established what was meant by pee-pee, it was a generic term for genital
area.
"Q. Before you get into that, what was, as best you recollect, what was her response to the question 'Do
you play with daddy?
"A. Yes, we play-I remember her making a comment about yes we play a lot and expanding on that and
talking about spending time with daddy.
"Q. And 'Does daddy play with you?' Was there any response?
"A. She responded to that as well, that they played together in a variety of circumstances and, you know,
seemed very unaffected by the question.
"Q. And then what did you say and her response?
"A. When I asked her 'Does daddy touch you with his pee-pee,' she did admit to that. When I asked,
'Do you touch his pee-pee,' she did not have any response.
"Q. Excuse me. Did you notice any change in her affect or attitude in that line of questioning?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What did you observe?
"A. She would not-oh, she did not talk any further about that. She would not elucidate what exactly-
what kind of touching was taking place or how it was happening. She did however, say that daddy does do
this with me, but he does it a lot more with my sister than with me.
"Q. And how did she offer that last statement? Was that in response to a question or was that just a
volunteered statement?
"A. That was a volunteered statement as I sat and waited for her to respond, again after she sort of
clammed-up, and that was the next statement that she made after just allowing some silence to occur."
14 Idaho's residual hearsay exception provides in relevant part:
"Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. The following are not excluded
by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness.
"(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which
it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C)
the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence."
"' Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3144.
IDAHO V. WRIGTrFall, 1990]
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The jury found respondent and Giles guilty of two counts of lewd contact with
a minor under age 16 and sentenced each defendant to 20 years imprisonment.76
Respondent and Giles separately appealed only from the conviction involving
the younger daughter.77  Giles failed to raise a constitutional challenge to the
admittance of Dr. Jambura's testimony under Idaho's residual hearsay exception.78
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Giles' conviction. 79 The respondent argued that
admission of Dr. Jambura's testimony under the residual hearsay exception violated
her Confrontation Clause rights. 0 The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the
respondent's contention, reversed the respondent's conviction and remanded the
case for a new trial. 1 The Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that admission of the
inculpatory hearsay testimony violated the respondent's federal constitutional right
to confront adverse witnesses.82 The court found Dr. Jambura's testimony of the
interview to be too unreliable to be admitted. 3 Specifically, the court found that the
younger daughter's statements "lacked the particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause" and that the
trial court erroneously admitted them.8'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the
State of Idaho had proven that the younger daughter's incriminating statements to
Dr. Jambura bore sufficient indicia of reliability to withstand scrutiny under the
Confrontation Clause.8 5 The Court held that the State of Idaho had not satisfied its




The Court followed the two prong "general approach" of Ohio v. Roberts7 to
decide whether Dr. Jambura's testimony should have been admitted.88 Because
U6ld. at 3145.
"Idaho v. Wright, 116 Idaho 382,775 P.2d 1224 (1989); Statev. Giles, 115 Idaho 984,772 P.2d 191 (1989).7
, Giles, at 984, 772 P.2d at 191.
9Id.
10 Wright, at 383,775 P.2d at 1225.
1 Id. at 382,775 P.2d at 1224.2 Wright, at 385, 775 P.2d at 1227.
I/d.
- Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3146-48.
110 S.Ct. at 833.
"Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3152-53.
'
7 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66. The first prong is the demonstration of the unavailability of the declarant
whose statement is sought to be used against the defendant. The second prong requires a statement to bear
adequate indicia of reliability. Reliability can be inferred if the evidence falls within a firmly-rooted hearsay
exception. Otherwise, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness." Id.
" Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3146-48.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:2
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neither party questioned whether the child was available, 9 the Court considered the
existence of adequate 'indicia of reliability' to be of primary importance. 90
The Court noted thatunderRoberts, a court may deem testimony as exhibiting
adequate 'indicia of reliability' 9' in two circumstances: (1) where the hearsay
statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception;92 or (2) where the hearsay
statement is supported by a "showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness."93 The Court has consistently refused to consider the residual hearsay
exception to be a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 94 This has meant that child
hearsay testimony must bear 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' 95
While the lower court focused upon the lack of procedural safeguards used in
the child's interview, the Court noted that the Constitution does not impose "a fixed
set of procedural prerequisites to the admission of such [hearsay] statements at
trial. '96 "Out-of-court statements made by children regarding sexual abuse arise in
a wide variety of circumstances." 9 The Supreme Court of Idaho articulated
commendable procedural safeguards. However, interview techniques could become
more important than the substance of the allegations if the Court so heavily
emphasizes procedure. The procedural safeguards do not accommodate the practi-
cal necessities that may arise when children make allegations of sexual abuse.9 The
Court wisely declined to imply "a preconceived and artificial litmus test" into the
Confrontation Clause for the "procedural propriety of professional interviews"
during which children may make incriminating statements. 99
'Totality of the Circumstances'
The Court expressly held that "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'
must be shown from the totality of the circumstances." 100 The Court cannot
formulate a mechanical test to determine the reliability of out-of-court statements.' 0 '
Only those circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render
the declarant particularly trustworthy are relevant.Y0 The 'particularized guarantees
89 The trial court found the child to be unable to communicate to the jury. Id. at 3143.
9 Id. at 3147-3153.
91 Id. at 3147.
State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984). "Exceptions to the general rule are based on the
historically established trustworthiness of the statement." Id. at 180, 691 P.2d at 204.
9 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
"See, Green, 399 U.S. at 155-156; Dutton, 400 U.S. at 86; Inadi, 475 U.S. at 393, n.5.
"Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3148.
9Id.
97 Id.
" See, e.g., Nelson, 874 F.2d at 1229 (videotaping not feasible where psychologist began therapy sessions
before psychologist knew criminal charges would be filed).
" Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3148.
1I Id.
"' Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396, 1400 (1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986).
' Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3149.
IDAHO V. WRIGH-TFall,1990]
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of trustworthiness' "must be at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly
rootedhearsay exception."'' 3 The hearsay statement is excludedunderthe Confron-
tation Clause "unless an affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which
the statement was made, provides a basis for rebutting the presumption that ahearsay
statement is not worthy of reliance at trial."'" Thus, corroborating evidence cannot
be used to determine the reliability of child hearsay statements. Only the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the statement are relevant under the Court's
totality of the circumstances examination. 0 5 The Court noted: "We think the
'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' required for admission under the
Confrontation Clause must likewise be drawn from the totality of circumstances that
surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly
worthy of belief."'1
In reaching the decision, the Court relied upon the rationale for permitting
exceptions to the general rule against hearsay evidence. Specifically, the Court
found that there may be instances where the test of cross-examination may be
superfluous and the proffered testimony is "free enough from the risk of inaccuracy
and untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination would be a work of
supererogation."m 7 The Court's opinion refused to allow corroborating evidence, in
whole or in part, to determine trustworthiness.I's The Court believed that corrobo-
rating evidence is merely bootstrapped onto the trustworthiness of other evidence at
trial.1 9 Because the proffered evidence must be so trustworthy that cross-examina-
tion would not aid the fact-finding process, the Court refused to allow "presump-
tively" unreliable evidence to be admitted.110 Presumptively unreliable evidence is
that hearsay evidence which fails to fall within one of the firmly rooted exceptions
or which fails to fulfill the adequate indicia of reliability."'
The Court rendered such a decision notwithstanding the many lower court
decisions that have relied upon corroborating evidence to establish reliability."12 As




'06 Id. at 3149.
107 Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3149 (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence sec. 1420, p. 251 (J. Chadbournerev. 1974)).
See also, Barker, 761 F.2d at 1400-01. "While always central to Confrontation Clause analysis and even
dispositive in some cases, cross-examination is not required in every case.... Thus, circumstances other
than prior cross-examination of the declarant by the defendant can show evidence to be trustworthy to a
degree that warrants its submission to the jury." Id.
io Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3153.
'09 Id. at 3150.
110Id.
"' See, e.g., Id. at 3147.
112 See, e.g.,Nelson, 874 F.2d at 1222; State v. J.C.E., 235 Mont. 264,767 P.2d 309 (1988); Statev. Sorenson,
143 Wis. 2d 226,421 N.W.2d 77 (1988); Gregory v. State of N.C., 900 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1990); Ellison v.
Sachs, 769 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1986); Jones v.
Dugger, 888 F.2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1989).
[Vol. 24:2
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people that one of the best ways to determine whether what someone says is
trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by other evidence.""' Corroboration
strengthens the reliability of an out-of-court statement. 114 The reliability of a child's
statement is enhanced through expert testimony which asserts that a child was
sexually abused." 5
Future Implications
In ten years, the incidence of reported child sexual abuse increased from less
than 1% per 10,000 children in 1976 to nearly 18% in 1985.116 This increase may
have resulted from the mandatory child abuse reporting laws which all 50 states have
enacted.' '7
Recognizing that the traditional hearsay exceptions inadequately assist child
sexual abuse prosecutions,"' many state legislatures enacted hearsay exceptions
specifically designed for child sexual abuse victims." 9 At least ten other states have
enacted hearsay exception statutes applicable to child sexual abuse prosecutions. 20
The legislatures have slowly realized that a judicial system designed by adults for
adults simply does not address the special needs of child sexual abuse victims.
Indeed, one commentator has called for all states to enact new hearsay exceptions
designed specifically to allow the admissibility of out-of-court statements of child
sexual abuse victims.121
While the states have attempted to address the growing problem of child
sexual abuse prosecutions, the Court's decision in Idaho v. Wright appears to
dampen this progress. In refusing to allow corroborating evidence of child hearsay
statements, the Court has failed to recognize the specific nature of child sexual abuse
cases. 22 Child abuse cases, by their very nature, lack an abundance of admissible
evidence. 23 Child abuse, particularly sexual abuse, generally occurs behind closed
doors, not in public for all to witness. Familial witnesses to the abuse are reluctant
to come forward, often due to the abuser's influence and intimidation." The
'"Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3153.
14 Myers, supra note 8, at 364.
I' d. at 365.
116 G. Nuce, Child Sexual Abuse: A New Decade for the Protection of our Children? 39 EmoRY L.J. 581,
581 (1990).
11 See, L Plaine, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions, 63 Gao. L. 257, 260-261
(1974).
11.D. Capra, Innovations in Prosecuting Child Sexual Abuse, NEw YoRK L. 3, 3 (Nov. 9, 1989).
"' W. Mlyniec and M. Dally, See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child SexualAbuse Victims BeAccomplished
Without Endangering the Defendant's Constitutional Rights? 40 U. MiAMi L. Rav. 115, 116, n.3 (1985).
20 Graham, supra note 58, at 534.
"I M. Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontations: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 19, 94-95 (1985).1 The Supreme Court of Montana noted that "special consideration must be given to proffered hearsay
testimony when the child declarant is unavailable as a witness." J.C.E., at 273, 767 P.2d at 315.
'z Plaine, supra note 117, at 259.
"uSee, generally, Id. at 260.
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prosecutor is left to rely upon the hearsay, character and circumstantial evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.125 Thus, relatively few
child sexual abuse prosecutions actually result in a conviction.
126
The residual hearsay exception is an appropriate method to admit child
hearsay statements if the statements are "otherwise proven sufficiently trustwor-
thy."'1 27 One commentator has noted that a general exception to the hearsay rule in
all cases of alleged child sexual abuse, however, might be unfair to a defendant.
12
A defendant in such a position would be required to refute damaging hearsay
evidence without the benefit of cross-examination. 29 However, this result also
occurs when other hearsay testimony which falls under a firmly rooted hearsay
exception is admitted in child abuse cases. 30 Therefore, a compelling need exists
for admissionof hearsay evidence which arises from the child sexual assault victim's
inability or refusal to verbally express themselves in court.' 3'
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has recognized the need to admit child
hearsay testimony in alleged sexual abuse cases. 32 The Wisconsin courts have
focused upon five factors that its courts should examine to determine whether a
child's statements, under the residual hearsay exception, possess the sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted.133 These factors include: (1) the
attributes of the child making the statement; (2) the person to whom the statement
was made; (3) the circumstances under which the statement was made; (4) the
content of the statement itself; and (5) other corroborating evidence." Thus,
Wisconsin, like many other states, has explicitly deemed 'other corroborating
evidence' to be a valuable aid. Yet now, the United States Supreme Court's Wright
decision appears to exclude, for Confrontation Clause purposes, such other corrobo-
rating evidence regardless of common sense's and prior judicial philosophy's
recommended scope of admissible evidence.
11 See, generally, Id.
126 Nuce, supra note 116.
" Sorenson, at 243, 421 N.W.2d at 84.
"n Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two LegislativeInnovations, 98 HAZv.
L. R v. 806, 820 (1985).
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439 (district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of
a foster mother which related a statement made by a five-year-old sexual assault victim where the victim
could not testify in a meaningful way due to her age and fright.); Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm,
715 F.2d 1050 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984) (child's incriminating declarations to nurses and
apolice officer were "excited utterances" within the ambit of the hearsay exception so that defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation was not violated by the admission.); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d
77 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981) (district court properly admitted testimony of doctor who
examined nine-year-old victim concerning statements made by her following the assault, inasmuch as all
of her statements were related to her physical condition and were consistent with the motive to promote
treatment).
131 Sorenson, at 243, 421 N.W.2d at 84.
1 2 Id. at 243, 421 N.W.2d at 834-84.
3 Id. at 245, 421 N.W.2d at 84.
3 Id. at 245-46, 421 N.W.2d at 84-85.
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Obviously, the interests of both the child sexual abuse victim and the
defendant must be adequately protected. As the Supreme Court of Arizona stated:
Society's need to prosecute accused abusers is no greater than its need to preserve
the Constitution. We refuse to repeal the confrontation clause for child abuse cases.
Child-victims' out-of-court statements are admissible only when.., the rules of
evidence and the principles announced inRoberts are fully satisfied. However, when
these elements are satisfied, and . . . the child's hearsay statements are the most
reliable evidence available, it would be a perversion of the confrontation clause to
exclude the evidence. The confrontation clause was intended to give the defendant
the benefit of what is usually the most reliable procedure, not to absolutely preclude
society's use of the most reliable evidence available.'35
CONCLUSION
The very nature of a prosecution of an alleged child sexual abuser places the
child in an adversarial posture against the defendant. Such a prosecution requires
the prosecutor to offer every piece of relevant information to the trier of fact. The
Court's decision in Idaho v. Wright 3" has taken away one of the methods which
prosecutors have utilized to demonstrate the reliability of hearsay statements:
corroboration. By excluding such potentially vital information, the Court has
rejected a common sense approach to aid in determining the reliability of the
proffered testimony and has thereby hindered the search for the truth. Thus, the
sexually victimized children remain powerless but for the adults who try to speak out
on their behalf.
LAURA BARKER
'" State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191,205, 735 P.2d 801, 815 (1987).
IM 110 S.CL 3139.
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